THE
Dan Smoot Report

Vol. 14, No. 4 (Broadcast 648) January 22, 1968 Dallas, Texas

DAN SMOOT

NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

On the day the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 was signed, President Johnson — knowing the Soviets were then testing the kind of orbital bomb the treaty outlawed, but concealing that fact from the public — said agreement on the treaty gave a "very hopeful sign" that other American-Soviet agreements would follow. Specifically, Johnson hopes for a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and an agreement with the Kremlin to stop the deployment of anti-missile missile systems.[1]

The nonproliferation treaty is the one now nearest acceptance.

In August, 1961, the Kennedy administration initiated formal negotiations, at the 18-nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, on a treaty to prohibit the five existing nuclear powers (U.S., U.S.S.R., Great Britain, France, communist China) from helping other nations develop the means of producing nuclear weapons. France would not permit its representative at the Disarmament Conference to participate, and announced that France would not adhere to a nonproliferation treaty if one were adopted. Communist China (not represented at the Disarmament Conference) said she also would ignore such a treaty.

After 4 years of negotiations, the United States (August, 1965) submitted a draft of a nonproliferation treaty. At the time, the United States was under pressure from its NATO allies to provide nuclear weapons for the defense of Europe. Hence, the U.S. proposal left open the possibility of a nuclear power transferring nuclear weapons to the *national control* of other nations, with the nuclear power retaining the right to veto decisions to use the weapons. The U.S. said this sharing of nuclear weapons already produced would not proliferate — increase the over-all number of — nuclear weapons.[2]

The Soviets said the *national control* phrase in American proposal was a loophole which would allow the United States to arm West Germany with nuclear weapons.[3]

On February 23, 1966, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said the Johnson administration was seeking a way to share nuclear weapons with NATO allies, as a means of inducing them to support a nonpro-

THE DAN SMOOT REPORT is published weekly by The Dan Smoot Report, Inc., Box 9538, Dallas Texas 75214 (office at 6441 Gaston Ave.). Subscriptions: $18.00 for 2 years; $10.00, 1 year; $6.00, 6 months. Dan Smoot was born in Missouri, reared in Texas. With BA and MA degrees from SMU (1938 and 1940), he joined the Harvard faculty (1941) as a Teaching Fellow, doing graduate work in American civilization. From 1942 to 1951, he was an FBI agent; from 1951 to 1955, a commentator on national radio and television. In 1955, he started his present independent, free-enterprise business: publishing this REPORT and abbreviating it each week for radio and TV broadcasts available for commercial sponsorship by business firms.

Copyright by Dan Smoot, 1968. Second Class mail privilege authorized at Dallas, Texas.
No Reproductions Permitted.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

liferation treaty, and, at the same time, was trying to eliminate Soviet objection to such sharing. He said the U.S. would propose another draft of a treaty, the new draft to require *international controls* over nuclear materials transferred from a nuclear to a non-nuclear power.[2]

On March 29, 1966, the Soviets rejected the new U.S. proposal, saying that the United States' professed intention to retain control over nuclear arms shared with West Germany and other allies would require the Soviet Union and other countries to "rest their security on the United States veto when the question of firing nuclear weapons is considered in NATO."[4]

On April 28, 1966, William C. Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, announced that the United States would open, for inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the plant and facilities of the Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., at West Valley, New York. This is a commercial plant that recovers plutonium and other nuclear materials by reprocessing the spent fuels of nuclear reactors. The United States had already given the International Atomic Energy Agency inspection control over power reactors, but this was the first time the international agency was given authority over a reprocessing plant. The gesture was made to reassure the Soviets of our determination to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and thus to win their approval of our proposed nonproliferation treaty; but, on the same day, the Soviets categorically rejected the treaty.[5]

On June 11, 1966, William C. Foster said the U.S. was preparing a third draft of a nonproliferation treaty, trying to circumvent Soviet objections to the first two drafts submitted by the U.S.[6]

On July 5, 1966, President Johnson announced that the U.S. was willing to make concessions to the Soviet Union, and expressed hope that an "agreeable compromise" on a nonproliferation treaty would be reached soon.

The President's statement was regarded as an ultimatum — for American diplomatic officials to hurry. The only concession that could conceivably please the Soviets would be a prohibition against American sharing of nuclear weapons with West Germany; but on July 6, 1967, George W. Ball (Under Secretary of State) said the U.S. was not willing to deny itself the option of meeting "the legitimate interests on the part of the non-nuclear countries in Europe in having a share in the management of their nuclear defense."[7]

On July 25, 1966, the Soviets repeated their allegation that the treaty proposed by the U.S. would enable U.S. allies to get American atomic arms and then trigger a nuclear war on their own. Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, denied the allegation.

United States officials asked the Soviets to accept a treaty incorporating all the points of agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., leaving the points of disagreement to be handled later. Soviet officials refused. They said they want a treaty which will make it impossible for a non-nuclear state to get control of, or access to, atomic arms, in any way. They claimed that this was the basic issue involved in a nonproliferation treaty, and that it would be useless to negotiate on secondary issues, leaving this major problem unresolved.[8]

On August 25, 1966, the five-year-old negotiations on a nonproliferation treaty were temporarily suspended when the Disarmament Conference at Geneva recessed until February, 1967. During the recess, U.S. and Soviet officials had private discussions on the treaty.[9]

On October 14, 1966, U.S. and U.S.S.R. officials announced that they would jointly sponsor an appeal for the UN General Assembly to urge all nations to refrain from actions that could lead to the spread of nuclear weapons. Officials at the UN considered Soviet agreement to the appeal a concession to the United States, and expressed hope that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were near agreement on a nonproliferation treaty. One qualified expert said such an agreement could come within a matter of weeks, adding:

"But it will take a much longer time to gain West Germany's agreement."[10]

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On February 9, 1967, Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin told a press conference in London that recent discussions indicated the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would soon reach an agreement on a nonproliferation treaty "whether West Germany likes it or not." He admitted the Soviets want the treaty primarily to keep West Germany from getting nuclear weapons.[11]

On February 14, 1967, Soviet and American officials announced general agreement on all articles of a nonproliferation treaty, except the article dealing with inspections.

Both sides agreed that there must be periodic international inspections of atomic energy plants to guarantee that fissionable materials produced for peaceful purposes were not being diverted to weapons-production. The Soviets insisted that inspection responsibility be given to the International Atomic Energy Agency (*which fell under control of communist-bloc nations soon after its creation in July*, 1957[12]).

American officials agreed to IAEA inspections, but suggested a compromise to placate our NATO allies, especially West Germany and Italy, who fear the IAEA will open their nuclear plants to Soviet industrial espionage — and that nuclear industry, to avoid IAEA inspections and controls, will go to France where the nonproliferation treaty will not be in effect and where no international inspections will be allowed. The American compromise proposal would give the job of inspections, for a 3-year interim period, to Euratom (European Atomic Energy Community, composed of six nations: West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France). During the interim, Euratom would devise some acceptable means of transferring the inspection responsibility to the IAEA.[9, 13]

The Soviets would not accept the American compromise, but did agree to join Americans (on February 21, 1967, when the Disarmament Conference reconvened) in submitting a treaty embodying all points of agreement, leaving blank Article III dealing with inspections.

Announcement of the February 14, 1967, American-Soviet agreement on a nonproliferation treaty created bitter political divisions among America's European allies. West German finance minister Franz Josef Strauss condemned the agreement as a "new Yalta of cosmic proportions."[14]

When the Disarmament Conference reconvened on February 21, 1967, the Soviets — reneging on their promise to join the U.S. in submitting a proposed nonproliferation treaty — attacked the U.S. for its "aggressive war" in Vietnam, and denounced West Germany for trying to get nuclear weapons.[15]

News from Geneva on February 23, 1967, indicated that the United States was prepared to withdraw its suggestion that Euratom be given interim authority to inspect atomic energy plants in Euratom nations, and was willing to accept the Soviet position that the International Atomic Energy Agency be solely responsible for all inspections.[16]

Early in June, 1967, William C. Foster submitted to the Geneva Disarmament Conference the nonproliferation treaty which the Soviets had refused to co-sponsor in February. The Soviets still refused, though the Johnson administration gave them specific assurances that the American nuclear stockpile would not be made available to our Western European allies, particularly West Germany. Negotiations deadlocked, and William C. Foster returned to Washington.

On August 10, 1967, the Soviets abruptly sent word that they were willing to sign the proposed treaty, as they had agreed in February. Foster rushed back to Geneva, but for 2 weeks the Soviets refused to discuss the matter. On August 23, the Soviets notified Foster they were ready to go ahead.

On August 24, 1967, Foster and Soviet officials submitted separate but identical texts of a nonproliferation treaty — the same treaty Foster had submitted in June. It prohibits nuclear powers from giving other nations, or helping other nations produce, nuclear weapons — but leaves blank Article III which, when completed, will deal with inspections.[17]

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On October 10, 1967 (the day the Outer Space Treaty was formally proclaimed, at a White House ceremony), Johnson administration officials accused our NATO allies of "dilatory tactics" which may indefinitely postpone, or even prevent, completion of the nonproliferation treaty. Soviet officials put most of the blame on West Germany, because of her refusal to put her nuclear programs under control of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Harland Cleveland, U.S. representative to NATO, was in Europe pressing our allies for a "prompt consensus."[18]

In the first week of December, 1967, President Johnson announced that the U.S. would throw open *all* its peaceful nuclear installations to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. This was interpreted as an effort to put pressure on Italy and West Germany to abandon their objections to inspection by the international agency.

West Germany and Italy remained adamant.

On December 11, 1967, Secretary of State Dean Rusk arrived in Brussels, to undertake personally the task of overcoming West German and Italian opposition to the nonproliferation treaty.[19]

Red China and France have already said they will not be bound by a nonproliferation treaty. Great Britain does not have the resources to help other nations produce nuclear weapons. That leaves only 2 nuclear powers affected: the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The Soviets will proliferate, or not proliferate, nuclear weapons as they please, no matter what a treaty may provide. That leaves only us to be prohibited from doing something that may be important to our national security — if a nonproliferation treaty is ever adopted. If one is adopted, Johnson will concentrate next on an ABM (antiballistic missiles) treaty, which he is already begging the Soviets to negotiate.

If an ABM treaty is adopted, Johnson will press on, step by step, toward the final goal of America's leftwing internationalists: a treaty pledging the United States to total disarmament. A total-disarmament treaty between us and the Soviets could mean total disaster for us. We would disarm; the Soviets would not.

The people should let the Senate, and all 1968 senatorial candidates, know that public opinion is strongly against a nonproliferation treaty, if one is ever sent to the Senate for ratification — is, indeed, against *any* treaty, with communist nations, affecting American defense.

Please notify us of any change of address *before* you move. With increased postal rates, we no longer can afford to remail issues returned by the Post Office.

FOOTNOTES

(1) *The Dallas Morning News*, December 27, 1967, p. D3; *The New York Times*, Jan. 28, 1967, p. 6

(2) *The New York Times*, Feb. 24, 1966, p. 11

(3) *The New York Times*, Feb. 20, 1966, p. 6

(4) *The New York Times*, Mar. 30, 1966, p. 3

(5) *The New York Times*, Apr. 29, 1966, p. 8

(6) *The New York Times*, June 12, 1966

(7) *The New York Times*, July 7, 1966, p. 8

(8) *The Dallas Times Herald*, July 26, 1966, p. A6; *The New York Times*, July 27, 1966, p. 5

(9) *The New York Times*, Feb. 16, 1967, p. 19

(10) *The New York Times*, Oct. 15, 1966, pp. 1, 5

(11) *The New York Times*, Feb. 10, 1967, pp. 1, 6

(12) "Reds Grab Key Jobs In World Atom Agency," by Robert S. Allen, *The Tablet*, Brooklyn N. Y., Nov. 2, 1957, and *The Birmingham News*, Nov. 3, 1957; "Expensive Bargain," by Seymour Freidin, *New York Post Magazine*, January 22, 1961, p. 7; editorial, *New York Daily News*, Oct. 7, 1961, p. 9

(13) *The New York Times*, Aug. 25, 1967, pp. 1, 12

(14) "Armaments," *Time* magazine, March 3, 1967, pp. 29-30

(15) *The New York Times*, Feb. 22, 1967, p. 10

(16) *The New York Times*, Feb. 24, 1967, p. 10

(17) *The New York Times*, Aug. 25, 1967, pp. 1, 12

(18) *The New York Times*, Oct. 11, 1967, pp. 1, 3

(19) *The Dallas Times Herald*, Dec. 11, 1967, p. A9

REPRINTS OF THIS ISSUE
(for bulk mailing to one address):

1 copy	$ .25	100 copies	$ 6.50
10 copies	1.00	200 copies	12.00
25 copies	2.00	500 copies	28.00
50 copies	3.50	1000 copies	50.00

Texans Add 2% for Sales Tax

THE DAN SMOOT REPORT TAYLOR 1-2303
BOX 9538 DALLAS, TEXAS 75214

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED